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Introduction and summary
The failure rate for thrifts (savings and loan associa-
tions and some savings banks) in the second half of
the 1980s and early 1990s was substantially higher
than in earlier decades. For example, the number of
thrift failures averaged about 32 per year between 1980
and 1985, compared with about 136 per year between
1986 and 1992 (CBO, 1993). The Federal Home Loan
Bank (FHLBank) System was the primary federal reg-
ulator of thrifts and was responsible for the supervi-
sion and examination of most of these failing institu-
tions. The FHLBank System also lent funds to thrifts
and became a reliable source of nondeposit funds to
support the lending activities of safe and sound in-
stitutions. According to Bodfish and Theobald (1938)
and as discussed in Barth and Regalia (1988), the
FHLBank System lending program was not intended
to bail out failing thrifts. However, many failed
thrifts borrowed from the FHLBank System during
the 1980s, and some borrowed a substantial amount
several years prior to their closure. For example, of
the 205 failed thrifts that were resolved (that is, liqui-
dated or merged with regulatory assistance) in 1988,
the year before Congress passed the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA),
76 percent borrowed from their FHLBank three years
before closure. In some cases, borrowings by these
thrifts were as high as 35 percent of total assets. In
their last year of operation, some of these thrifts financed
about 72 percent of their total assets with FHLBank
loans. By contrast, only 40 percent of their solvent
counterparts borrowed from FHLBanks at the end of
1988, financing, in some cases, only 46 percent of
total assets.
At the time of their closure, the estimated present-
value cost to the now defunct Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) to resolve the
205 thrift failures exceeded $32 billion. Because of
their poor financial condition, some of these thrifts
could not provide adequate collateral (that is, eligible
assets) to secure their FHLBank loans.1 Hence, the
FSLIC issued guarantees for some of the more poorly
capitalized thrifts to secure the funds lent by FHLBanks
(see Garcia and Plautz, 1988).2 Given these develop-
ments, the question of whether FHLBank lending to
financially distressed thrifts increased FSLIC losses
during the 1980s naturally arises. Because FHLBanks
claim on thrift assets was senior to that of the FSLIC,
lending to troubled thrifts increased the risk of loss
to the FSLIC and potentially added to the cost of thrift
failure resolutions. As a result, taxpayers and policy-
makers have an interest in understanding the economic
role of the FHLBank System in the thrift debacle of
the 1980s and how a given government regulatory
structure can have unintended consequences.
The FHLBank System was created to provide
long-term liquidity to residential real-estate-specialized
lending institutions so as to improve the flow of
mortgage credit. While this concept made sense after
the Great Depression, it may not make sense in a finan-
cial market that has become more efficient with the
introduction of a secondary market for mortgages
and mortgage securitization. These developments
raise the question whether there is a need for a govern-
ment-sponsored liquidity facility for real-estate-spe-
cialized lending institutions. The question takes on
added importance in view of evidence that smaller
thrifts, which are likely to have fewer alternative34 Economic Perspectives
sources of long-term liquidity, tend to use the FHLBank
advance (loan) program less than larger thrifts. Also,
it is important to note that FHLBank advances do not
subject borrowing thrifts to the discipline that would
be imposed by other creditors and market analysts.
By insulating them from market discipline, FHLBank
advance programs provide incentives for borrowing
thrifts to take more risk. This is an important issue for
policymakers, who are concerned about minimizing the
loss exposure of the federal deposit insurance funds.
During the thrift debacle of the 1980s, FHLBank
advances to individual thrifts varied considerably in
terms of net worth and borrowings relative to the
thrifts total assets. We use data on these variations
to test whether FHLBanks made credit available to
the most troubled thrifts, defined as those with the
largest gap between their regulatory accounting prin-
ciple (RAP) capital and generally accepted accounting
principle (GAAP) capital. RAP allowed thrifts to count,
as part of capital, appraised equity capital, qualifying
subordinated debentures, and net worth certificates
issued by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
to increase recorded, though not economic, net worth.
In addition, thrifts were allowed to defer losses on
the sale of assets that carried below-market interest
rates.3 These items capture the extent to which regu-
lators granted thrifts regulatory forbearance by allow-
ing them to invent assets that artificially inflated
their capital. These modifications in the definition of
capital were designed to give troubled thrifts time to
initiate strategies that would return them to financial
health. Thrifts with most of their reported capital in
these forms might not be able to raise noninsured
sources of funds in the private sector. FHLBank lend-
ing to thrifts with the largest gap between RAP and
GAAP capital gave them time to attempt to recover,
as well as time to gamble for resurrection by making
large volumes of higher-risk, potentially high-profit
investments. If the investments made good, the thrift
would reap the profits, but if the investments soured
and the thrift went broke, the FSLIC and not the thrifts
owners would be liable for the losses. This incentive
to gamble for resurrection is strongest when there
is little equity left. Thus, it is likely that the magni-
tude and cost to taxpayers of the 1980s thrift debacle
were increased by regulatory forbearance policies,
including FHLBanks provision of aid to financially
distressed firms.4
In addition to examining whether financially dis-
tressed thrifts made greater use of FHLBank advances
than financially sound thrifts, we consider whether
the pattern of borrowings differed by FHLBank district.
Because of the collapse of the oil industry and its
associated effect on real estate prices in the early
1980s, many thrift institutions in the ninth district of
the FHLBank System (Arkansas, Louisiana, Missis-
sippi, New Mexico, and Texas) became insolvent.5 In
some states, congressional pressure persuaded thrift
regulators to grant forbearance and increased access
to the FHLBank advance program to aid poorly capi-
talized institutions. Finally, because we would expect
financially distressed thrifts to benefit most from
access to FHLBank funds and this benefit to be
reflected in their stock returns, we examine whether
changes in FHLBank advances are related to thrift
stock returns.
We find that total advances to thrift institutions
rose sharply over the 1980s, reached a peak in 1988,
and declined in the latter part of the 1980s and early
1990s. The peak borrowing was reached in 1988, one
year prior to the enactment of FIRREA, and the decline
took place over the period when regulators were clos-
ing down failing thrifts. We find that, for each year from
1985 to 1991, thrifts with book-value capital less than
or equal to zero borrowed proportionately more from
FHLBanks than better capitalized thrifts. That is, there
is a negative correlation between FHLBank advances
and capital. Our results are consistent with those of
Garcia and Plautz (1988), who used data for FSLIC-
insured thrifts for the fourth quarter of 1986 to show
that the growth of FHLBank advances was greater for
troubled thrifts than other institutions.
To get a better sense of whether troubled thrifts
relied more heavily on FHLBank advances than their
financially stronger counterparts, we use annual data
for all FSLIC-insured thrifts from 1985 to 1991 to exam-
ine the relationship between FHLBank advances and
several measures of thrifts financial condition. Because
poorly capitalized thrifts held a greater proportion of
risky assets than other thrifts and thrifts with a high
proportion of risky assets tended to borrow more
from FHLBanks, our finding that FHLBank advances
increased with thrift undercapitization could reflect
the risky assets in thrift asset portfolios. To control
for this effect, we estimate the relationship between
FHLBank advances and various financial factors,
including risky asset ratios, book capitalization, and
the extent to which book capital has been inflated by
regulatory accounting practices. We find that the
relationship between book capital and FHLBank
advances, controlling for risky assets, is negative.
That is, financially distressed thrifts tended to borrow
more on average than financially stronger thrifts.
We also find that FHLBank advances increase when
assets are riskier. This contradicts the notion that
FHLBanks lend to safe and sound institutions.35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
The variable measuring the extent to which thrifts were
using regulatory cosmetic accounting techniques to
artificially inflate their capital position is positively
correlated with FHLBank advances. Thus, a thrift using
a relatively high amount of regulatory accounting
items tended to borrow more from an FHLBank than
another thrift, even if they had the same book capital
ratio. This finding is important because it suggests
that regulators modifications of rules to close down
insolvent depository institutions can increase the
value of access to government subsidies (such as
FHLBank advances) and affect the behavior of the
regulated institutions.
Finally, we use quarterly stock market return data
for 99 publicly traded thrift organizations from 1985
to 1992 to determine whether borrowing from FHLBanks
was viewed favorably by the stock market. This expands
on the work of Brewer (1995) and Brewer and Mond-
schean (1994), which examined the impact of asset
mix changes on common stock returns of financially
distressed thrifts and their healthier counterparts.
Both studies found that thrifts, depending on their
financial condition, can exploit underpriced federal
deposit insurance by shifting into riskier activities,
because such shifts raise asset risk, increasing the
value of deposit insurance and leading to higher
common stock returns. Similarly, increases in advances
from FHLBanks, using thrift good assets as collateral,
allow thrifts to exploit federal deposit insurance by
increasing the risk to the FSLIC. We would expect the
stock returns of troubled thrifts to increase more than
those of financially sound thrifts when they increase
their borrowing from FHLBanks. Our stock return results
suggest that having increased access to FHLBanks
advances was associated with one-time increases in
the common stock returns of troubled thrifts. Because
FHLBank claims on thrift assets are senior to those of
the FSLIC, lending to troubled thrifts increased the risk
of the FSLICs position. This shift benefited shareholders
because, during the period under review, the regula-
tors did not charge a risk-based deposit insurance
premium. Our results indicate that the benefits from
borrowing at FHLBanks were associated with higher
stock returns.
Structure of the FHLBank System
The financial distress that thrifts experienced and
the accompanying disruption in the mortgage market
during the Great Depression prompted Congress to
pass several bills to stabilize the savings and home
financing industry. First, Congress passed the Federal
Home Loan Act of 1932, creating the FHLBank System.
This system, designed along the lines of the Federal
Reserve System, consists of 12 FHLBanks, each serv-
ing a geographically distinct district. In addition, the
Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 created the FHLBank
Board as a federal government agency with supervi-
sory responsibility for the FHLBanks.
The main purposes of the FHLBank System were
to provide liquidity to thrifts, thereby facilitating home
ownership through greater availability of mortgages,
and to be the primary federal regulator of thrifts. Simi-
lar to district Federal Reserve banks, FHLBanks are
wholly owned by member institutions. Prior to 1989,
members included all federal savings and loan associ-
ations and state chartered savings and loans that vol-
untarily chose and qualified to be members.6 Each
member institution is required to hold an equity stake
in its district FHLBank.
In 1934, Congress enacted the National Housing
Act, which established the FSLIC within the FHLBB,
to promote confidence in the thrift industry through
share capital (or deposit) insurance at thrifts. The ini-
tial deposit insurance was $5,000 per account, similar
to that at commercial banks. This amount has been
increased periodically, with the last change to $100,000
occurring in 1980.
This supervisory and regulatory structure remained
in place until the late 1980s, when the deterioration in
the financial condition of the S&L industry caused
Congress to restructure the way the industry is regu-
lated and insured and improve supervisory control.
FIRREA, signed into law by President Bush on August
9, 1989, abolished both the FSLIC and the FHLBB. In
their place, the act established the Federal Housing
Finance Board (FHFB) as an independent agency,
responsible for overseeing the operations of the 12
regional FHLBanks, relinquished control of the insur-
ance functions to the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), and transferred the thrift supervisory
and regulatory functions of the FHLBB and the FHL-
Banks to a new Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in
the Department of the Treasury.
The FHFB consists of a five-member board, includ-
ing the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development,
and is funded through assessments on the FHLBanks.7
The board ensures that the FHLBanks carry out their
housing finance mission, remain adequately capitalized,
and are able to raise funds in the capital market. In
addition, the FHFB must ensure that the FHLBanks
operate in a safe and sound manner by following
regulations governing their operations.
Financial condition of FHLBanks
At the end of 1996, total assets of the FHLBanks
























Financial characteristics of FHLBanks
($ in millions)
Consolidated Capital FHLB Retained Total Total
Year Advances Investments obligations stock assets earnings capital assets Capital ratio
1960 $1,981 $1,233 $1,266 $989 $3,316 $83 $1,072 $3,316 0.3233
1965 5,997 1,640 5,221 1,277 7,806 158 1,435 7,806 0.1838
1970 10,615 3,732 10,181 1,607 14,723 260 1,867 14,723 0.1268
1971 7,936 2,520 6,840 1,618 11,001 281 1,899 11,001 0.1726
1972 7,979 2,225 6,671 1,756 10,731 299 2,055 10,731 0.1915
1973 15,147 3,437 14,449 2,122 19,066 374 2,496 19,066 0.1309
1974 21,804 3,097 19,445 2,624 25,499 539 3,163 25,499 0.1240
1975 17,845 4,376 16,383 2,705 22,708 590 3,295 22,708 0.1451
1976 15,862 6,079 14,620 2,889 22,481 634 3,523 22,481 0.1567
1977 20,173 3,749 16,009 3,295 24,566 681 3,976 24,566 0.1618
1978 32,670 3,414 25,109 4,120 36,767 837 4,957 36,767 0.1348
1979 41,838 3,693 30,372 5,149 46,428 943 6,092 46,428 0.1312
1980 48,963 4,328 37,268 5,160 54,347 869 6,029 54,347 0.1109
1981 65,194 8,157 54,131 5,827 74,680 974 6,801 74,680 0.0911
1982 66,011 12,575 55,972 6,269 80,262 1,144 7,413 80,262 0.0924
1983 58,977 9,841 48,931 6,395 72,490 1,339 7,734 72,490 0.1067
1984 74,618 17,584 65,085 7,200 96,993 1,503 8,703 96,993 0.0897
1985 88,835 19,243 74,460 8,313 112,179 1,792 10,105 112,179 0.0901
1986 108,645 17,388 88,752 9,485 131,427 2,323 11,808 131,427 0.0898
1987 133,058 16,538 116,386 11,281 154,177 2,464 13,745 154,177 0.0892
1988 152,799 16,981 136,513 13,177 174,737 2,343 15,520 174,737 0.0888
1989 141,795 33,912 136,799 13,385 180,677 820 14,205 180,677 0.0786
1990 117,103 44,280 118,437 11,104 165,742 521 11,625 165,742 0.0701
1991 79,065 71,740 108,149 10,200 154,556 495 10,695 154,556 0.0692
1992 79,884 79,133 114,652 9,921 162,134 531 10,452 162,134 0.0645
Source: Federal Housing Finance Board.37 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 2
Type of security 1985 1987 1989 1991 1992
Treasury securities 5.57 4.76 2.79 1.62 4.05
Federal agency
securities 0.33 0.53 0.55 0.00 15.16
Federal funds 75.76 71.27 62.93 44.53 34.49
Bankers acceptances 0.37 0.22 0.34 0.00 0.00
Certificates of deposit 0.97 1.71 0.97 0.00 0.00
FHLBank consolidated
securities funda 16.96 20.19 20.60 0.00 0.00
Securities repurchase
agreements 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.17 12.33
Commercial paperb 0.00 0.00 5.88 9.75 0.00
Mortgage-backed
securities 0.00 0.00 6.23 21.33 29.06
Other securities 0.03 1.74 0.00 7.69 4.91
Total dollar
investments (billions) 19.3 17.4 32.0 72.4 79.7
Percent of total assets 17.0 11.0 18.0 46.0 49.0
aThe consolidated securities fund is a centralized portfolio management
system for securities owned by FHLBanks operated by the Office of
Finance. It invests primarily in short-term money market instruments.
bBeginning in 1996, commercial paper also contains bank notes.
Source:  Federal Housing Finance Board.
Investment portfolios of FHLBanks
(percent of total investments)
1989 (see table 1). The FHLBanks are capitalized
through the retention of earnings and the purchase
of stock by member institutions. As of yearend 1996,
the FHLBanks, on a consolidated basis, had a book
capital (including par value of common stock and
retained earnings) to total on-balance-sheet asset ratio
of 5.5 percent.8 This ratio is slightly higher than the
target leverage ratio of 5 percent for depository insti-
tutions to be classified as well capitalized under prompt
corrective action provisions of the FDIC Improvement
Act of 1991. However, because all members of the
FHLBank System, except federally chartered thrifts,
can withdraw from membership, the permanence of
this capital base is questionable at best. While a
members capital stock cannot be withdrawn immedi-
ately upon demand and an FHLBank cannot redeem
stock if the redemption would cause the FHLBank to
be undercapitalized, the temporary nature of the capital
base could be of concern if the FHLBanks experience
losses or membership becomes unattractive.
In addition to capital, funding for FHLBanks
comes from debt issued as consolidated obligations
of the 12 FHLBanks and consists of bonds and dis-
count notes that are limited by statute to an amount
not to exceed 20 times the total paid-in-capital stock
and legal reserves of all FHLBanks. Although FHLBank
System debt does not carry an explicit federal govern-
ment guarantee, the fact that FHLBanks operate under
a federal charter and government supervision creates
a perception of an implicit government guarantee.
FHLBank debt carries an AAA credit rating and coupon
income is exempt from state and local income taxes.
FHLBank funds are used to make advances to
member thrift institutions and to hold a portfolio of
investment securities. Traditionally, FHLBanks held
a portfolio of investment securities to earn interest
income on proceeds from prepaid loans from member
institutions, to invest members overnight deposits,
and to have a ready source of liquidity to satisfy un-
anticipated demands for advances by member institu-
tions (see table 2). The types of investment securities
that FHLBanks can hold are determined by their super-
visory agency and include obligations of the U.S.
Treasury, Federal National Mortgage Association,
and Government National Mortgage Association;
mortgages, obligations, or other securities sold by
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; and
instruments a fiduciary or trust fund may invest in
under the laws of the state in which the FHLBank is
located. Holdings of investment securities grew about
130 percent between the end of 1985 and
the end of 1990.
During the 1980s, advances averaged
about 84 percent of the FHLBank Systems
total assets, ranging from 78 percent to
90 percent over the decade. FHLBanks
are required to secure the funds advanced
to member institutions. The collateraliza-
tion feature gives FHLBanks prior claim
to assets in the event of a thrift failure.
The collateral is in the form of first mort-
gages, U.S. government securities (Trea-
sury and agency securities), deposits at
FHLBanks, and real estate assets approved
by FHLBanks. While U.S. government
securities and deposits at FHLBanks rep-
resent high-quality collateral, mortgages
could be low-quality collateral if under-
writing standards are poor, leading to sub-
standard loans. Although borrowing insti-
tutions have different risk profiles and
the quality of their collateral may vary,
FHLBanks offer advances at a flat rate in-
dependent of risk. Furthermore, FHLBanks
offer advances at lower interest rates than
the thrifts could obtain on their own. This
is possible because FHLBanks, in turn,
are able to jointly issue consolidated38 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 3
Maturity distribution of FHLBank advances
($ in millions)
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Years 1985 of total 1987 of total 1989 of total 1992 of total
1 40,687 46 50,803 38 33,783 28 33,184 41
2 13,777 16 20,235 15 30,202 25 14,127 18
3 11,189 13 15,057 11 18,196 15 11,824 15
4 5,630 6 14,187 11 15,872 13 6,075 8
5 5,797 6 10,597 8 7,657 6 6,750 8
Longer than 5 11,771 13 22,175 17 14,731 12 7,946 10
Total 88,851 133,055 120,443 79,906
Source: Federal Home Loan Bank System, Financial Reports, 1985, 1987, 1989, and 1992.
obligations, or debt securities to the market, paying
rates lower than similar securities issued by depository
institutions. The market is willing to accept lower
investment rates due to the tax-exempt status of the
consolidated obligations and because it is pricing in
an implicit government backing of the securities.
FHLBank advances support the home
mortgage market
Proponents of the FHLBank System felt that thrifts
needed the liquidity provided by the FHLBank advance
program because of the maturity mismatch between
their liabilities and assets. A typical thrift makes long-
term, fixed rate mortgage loans, financed by short-term,
effectively variable rate deposits, which can make for
challenging financial management. A sudden increase
in market rates, for example, can create several diffi-
culties for a thrift. Because incoming mortgage interest
income is based on fixed-rate mortgage loans, it can-
not re-price such mortgages at the higher market rates
of interest. Due to the long-term nature of such assets,
the thrift could miss out for several years on the higher
market interest rates that an institution with a shorter
term asset structure would enjoy. Furthermore, if the
increase in market interest rates is sharp and unexpected
and the thrift is not able to increase its deposit rates
quickly, it could experience substantial deposit out-
flows as its customers transfer their funds into instru-
ments with more attractive returns. Such a deposit
outflow would make it difficult for the thrift to fund
new, higher-yielding mortgage loans. Even if the
thrift reacts to the increased market interest rate by
offering competitive rates to its depositors, it then
has to pay out more than it is receiving in income
from older mortgage loans. The advances provided
by FHLBanks can ease some of these difficulties by
supporting the lending activities of the thrift industry.
The statement of policy on advances in the Code of
Federal Regulation indicates that:
[T]he primary credit mission of the Federal Home
Loan Banks is to provide a reliable source of credit
for member institutions. ... Advances generally shall
be made to creditworthy members upon application
for any sound business purpose in which members
are authorized to engage. Such purposes include, but
are not limited to, making residential mortgage, con-
sumer, and commercial loans, covering savings with-
drawals, accommodating seasonal cash needs, restruc-
turing liabilities, and maintaining adequate liquidity.
(U.S. Federal Home Loan Bank System, 1987, 531.1)
By providing member institutions with access
to advances with maturities varying from overnight
to 20 years (see table 3), FHLBanks can stabilize the
flow of residential mortgage loans issued by thrifts
during periods of deposit outflows. The availability
of FHLBank advances enhances the liquidity of mort-
gages and mortgage-related assets, such as mortgage-
backed securities. Since thrifts and other depository
institutions face fluctuations in their deposits, they
need to hold a sufficient amount of liquid assets.
Mortgage loans and other long-term assets are illiq-
uid, but they can be used as collateral to borrow from
FHLBanks. The availability of FHLBank loans allows
member institutions to hold a more illiquid and, presum-
ably, a more profitable asset portfolio than otherwise.
Furthermore, FHLBank advances provide a means to
move surplus funds from regions of the country with ex-
cess funds to regions where demand for mortgage fi-
nancing exceeds the local institutions supply of funds.
Figure 1 shows the trend in advances over the
197092 period and table 4 reports on FHLBank lend-
ing activity in selected years from 1960 to 1992. As
noted earlier, advances to FHLBank members rose
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Year Made Repaid Outstanding members assets
1960 1,943 2,097 1,981 2.9
1965 5,007 4,335 5,997 4.7
1970 3,255 1,930 10,615 6.2
1971 2,714 5,392 7,936 3.9
1972 4,792 4,750 7,979 3.4
1973 10,013 2,845 15,147 5.7
1974 12,763 6,106 21,804 7.5
1975 5,468 9,425 17,845 5.4
1976 8,114 10,097 15,862 4.1
1977 13,756 9,445 20,173 4.5
1978 25,166 12,800 32,670 6.3
1979 29,166 19,998 41,838 7.3
1980 36,585 29,460 48,963 7.9
1981 53,941 37,709 65,194 10.0
1982 53,744 52,928 66,011 9.5
1983 44,724 51,758 58,977 7.8
1984 91,239 75,598 74,618 8.4
1985 133,651 119,417 88,835 9.4
1986 181,661 161,833 108,645 9.3
1987 194,381 170,000 133,058 10.6
1988 187,536 167,809 152,799 11.5
1989 218,876 229,874 141,795 11.3
1990 149,459 174,157 117,103 
1991 175,673 213,710 79,065 
1992 263,088 262,186 79,884 
Sources: United States League of Savings Institutions, Savings Institutions
Sourcebook, 1987; FHLBank System, Financial Reports, Washington, DC,
198792; and Office of Thrift Supervision, Savings and Home Financing
Source Book, Washington, DC, 1989.
Advances
Sources: United States League of Savings Institutions, Savings Institutions
Sourcebook, 1987; FHLBank System, Financial Reports, Washington, DC,
198792; and Office of Thrift Supervision, Savings and Home Financing
Source Book, Washington, DC, 1989.
and declined during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. FHLBank advances offer
member institutions several advantages
over other sources of funds. First, ad-
vances are immediately available. Second,
member institutions have a fair amount
of flexibility in choosing the maturity and
volume of their advances. Third, advanc-
es do not carry the withdrawal risk asso-
ciated with deposits. Fourth, unlike de-
posits, no reserve requirements or deposit
insurance premiums are associated with
advances.9 The results of a recent study
of the FHLBank loan program indicated
that in addition to the traditional use of
advances as a source of liquidity, advances
are a particularly attractive source of funds
for poorly capitalized thrifts. Using data
for the fourth quarter of 1986, Garcia and
Plautz (1988) show that deposit outflows
are offset by increased advances. This
study also found that advances to low-
capital firms nationwide and in states with
the largest number of troubled thrifts (for
example, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Texas) rose more quickly
than the national average.
FHLBank advances aid poorly
capitalized thrifts
Proponents of the FHLBank System
argue that FHLBank advances are neces-
sary to provide lending institutions that
specialize in real estate access to nonde-
posit sources of funds because such insti-
tutions have few, if any, alternative non-
deposit sources of funds. This is especially
a concern for small thrifts, which may not
participate in the repurchase agreement,
commercial paper, or brokered deposits
markets. However, in 1988, advances to
institutions with less than $500 million in
total assets accounted for only 13 percent
of all advances (see table 5). On the other
hand, thrifts with total assets in excess of
$500 million relied heavily on advances in
1988, with some 89 percent borrowing from
FHLBanks, accounting for 87 percent of
total FHLBank advances. Furthermore,
FHLBank advances, which represented
11 percent, on average, of the borrowers
total assets in 1988, were being used to
replace more costly funding sources rather40 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 5
FHLBank thrift borrower characteristics
(December 31, 1988)
Number of Percent Advances to borrower Percent of all
Asset size institutions that borrow assets, percent outstanding advances
Thrifts 2,991 62 11
    Less than $500 million 2,542 57 8 13
    $500 million or more 449 89 12 87
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Savings and Loan Regulatory Reports, December 31, 1988.
than to fund additional mortgage lending (see Garcia
and Plautz, 1988, and Mays and DeMarco, 1989).
During the thrift debacle of the 1980s, FHLBank
advances were increasingly used to provide assistance
to failing thrifts that were losing deposits, particularly
uninsured deposits. FHLBanks made advances to
thrifts that would have found it more difficult and
more costly to raise funds through other sources. At
times, they even made advances to thrifts that lacked
the necessary collateral in exchange for a guarantee
of repayment provided by the FSLIC (see Garcia and
Plautz, 1988). Finally, when a thrift had exhausted all
collateral options and FSLIC guarantees were not
available, advances were made by the Joint Lending
Program of the Federal Reserve Banks, the FHLBanks,
and the FSLIC.10
Table 6 shows the proportion of yearend total
assets financed with advances for thrifts nationwide
and for thrifts in the six states (California, Florida,
Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) that accounted
for the largest share of the total cost of failure resolu-
tions from 1985 to 1991.11 Both nationwide and in five
of the six states, insolvent thrifts, that is, thrifts with
GAAP capital less than or equal to zero, borrowed
proportionately more from FHLBanks than solvent
institutions. From these limited data, insolvent thrifts
appeared to use more FHLBank advances than the
rest of the industry.
The tendency of FHLBanks to aid troubled thrifts
raises several issues. First, FHLBanks are providing
subsidized aid. Rates on advances, which are fixed at
the time of borrowing, vary by maturity and date of
commitment but not by risk of the borrowing thrift.
The rates on advances are set by each FHLBank as a
fixed spread over the Systems expected cost of funds.12
According to Garcia and Plautz (1988), these rates
should be comparable to the rates that a large, well-
capitalized thrift could obtain on its own account.
While a large, well-capitalized thrift may be paying
a fair price for advances, a financially distressed
association would be obtaining funds at below mar-
ket rates.
Second, during the 1980s, aid to financially dis-
tressed thrifts by FHLBanks provided the funds nec-
essary for the government to engage in capital forbear-
ance. This practice allowed weak (high-risk) thrifts to
continue to operate without the capital constraints
imposed on strong (low-risk) thrifts. Supporters of
forbearance policies argued that thrifts weakened by
technical liquidity problemscash outflows exceeding
inflowsshould be given the chance to recover.13
As these temporary problems went away, the thrifts
could use their new profits to build equity and re-
serves against future losses. However, in the late
1980s, forbearance was bestowed on thrifts experi-
encing credit quality problems that far exceeded issues
of technical liquidity.
The practice of forbearance exempted some thrifts
from regulatory capital requirements for extended peri-
ods of time. Other thrifts benefiting from forbearance
were allowed to invent value for assets that artificially
inflated their regulatory net worth. These included
nonstandard considerations of appraised equity capi-
tal, income capital certificates, net worth certificates,
and deferred losses. FHLBanks supported forbearance
by extending advances to many failing thrifts as they
lost deposits, particularly uninsured deposits.
Lack of reserves in the FSLIC fund prevented
thrift regulators from resolving institutions commonly
known to be beyond hope of recovery. The Competi-
tive Equality Banking Act of 1987, among other things,
required the FHLBB to give thrifts time to initiate
strategies for a return to capital adequacy.
However, the evidence shows that capital forbear-
ance was a gamble for the FSLIC and its cost turned
out to be significant (see DeGennaro and Thomson,
1996). The policy encouraged thrift management to
gamble for resurrection by making large volumes of
high-risk, potentially high-profit loans. If the gamble
paid off, the thrift would reap the profits; if it backfired,41 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 6
Federal Home Loan Bank thrift advances, December 31 of each year
(Percent of total assets)
Capital ratio 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Total industry £ to 0% 6.75 8.05 9.37 10.82 9.52 7.40 4.04
03% 4.82 5.16 6.91 7.78 7.86 6.79 5.51
>3% 2.77 3.24 4.13 4.29 3.67 3.14 2.83
Total industry 3.78 4.25 5.34 5.54 4.93 3.79 3.04
California £ to 0% 9.81 8.09 3.29 3.48 3.14 8.21 2.17
03% 5.30 5.90 5.08 6.81 6.26 5.20 1.13
>3% 3.54 3.79 4.54 5.08 5.25 5.77 5.37
Total state 4.70 4.70 4.40 5.15 5.11 5.82 4.91
Florida £ to 0% 6.38 7.48 9.56 10.85 8.00 9.28 2.47
03% 5.40 5.63 8.58 9.95 7.49 3.90 2.76
>3% 3.37 4.34 5.45 6.14 4.99 3.95 4.49
Total state 4.21 4.92 6.43 7.20 5.80 4.67 4.00
Illinois £ to 0% 3.51 4.19 6.09 6.29 4.78 6.01 6.18
03% 3.67 3.38 4.15 4.33 3.62 3.19 1.08
>3% 1.24 2.07 2.45 2.06 1.92 1.68 1.28
Total state 2.33 2.76 3.50 3.12 2.57 1.92 1.38
Louisianna £ to 0% 12.32 10.85 13.10 15.77 12.13 6.73 1.87
03% 4.60 4.33 5.05 5.40 2.24 0.90 1.56
>3% 2.33 2.62 3.65 5.32 3.54 1.32 0.56
Total state 5.49 5.25 6.43 8.81 6.53 2.81 0.75
Oklahoma £ to 0% 5.99 8.74 11.57 7.87 9.07 9.72 0
03% 8.31 7.60 10.69 10.67 11.35 7.95 0.71
>3% 5.50 5.20 5.45 9.11 5.24 6.92 4.97
Total state 6.07 6.77 8.84 9.48 8.03 7.58 3.85
Texas £ to 0% 6.26 9.97 11.30 13.86 10.24 5.86 0
03% 3.88 4.38 6.40 10.64 14.77 6.69 0.40
>3% 4.31 4.26 5.80 7.03 5.02 5.49 4.80
Total state 4.52 6.01 8.36 10.45 9.19 5.75 4.08
Notes: These figures are averages of the ratio of FHLBank advances to total assets. Thrifts are divided into three groups:
1) Thrifts with negative book equity according to generally accepted accounting principles; 2) low-capital thrifts, with positive
net worth below 3 percent of assets; and 3) well-capitalized thrifts, with net worth above 3 percent of assets.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Savings and Loan Regulatory Reports, 198591.
the FSLIC would be liable for the losses. This incentive
arises from the combination of deregulation, inade-
quate regulatory supervision, and deposit insurance
premiums that are not based on risk, and it is stron-
gest when there is little equity left. Thus, the magni-
tude and cost of the thrift debacle in the 1980s were
likely increased by forbearance practices that included,
among other things, FHLBanks providing aid to finan-
cially distressed firms.
Table 7 provides financial characteristics of the
205 thrifts that were resolved by the FSLIC in 1988,
the year before Congress passed FIRREA. Barth, Bar-
tholomew, and Labich (1989) report that a substantial
number of these resolved thrifts had been insolvent
since the early 1980s. The delay in closing insolvent
thrifts increased the value of access to deposit insur-
ance and allowed thrifts to shift more risk to the deposit
insurer. As table 7 shows, the thrifts resolved in 1988
held more commercial real estate loans, acquisition
and development loans, non-mortgage loans (business
and consumer), and direct investmentsall generally
viewed as riskier asset classes than residential mort-
gage loansthan the industry average in each of the
three years prior to failure. At the same time, FHLBank
advances as a fraction of total assets were higher at
resolved thrifts than at non-resolved thrifts, rising
from 6.4 percent at the end of 1985 to 10.6 percent in
the last year before closure in 1988. These numbers
suggest that FHLBank advances grew as thrift capital
declined; advances also grew with the extent to42 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 7
FHLBank advances and other financial characteristics of 1988 resolutions
(Percent of total assets)
1985 1986 1987
Financial ratios  1988 failures Industry 1988 failures Industry 1988 failures Industry
Mortgage loans
Residential 34.84 50.84 33.06 48.27 32.78 48.86
Commercial 13.76 8.52 12.65 8.48 11.96 8.31
Land 9.50 2.53 8.55 2.40 6.00 1.98
Others 12.54 11.44 12.17 12.03 11.76 13.58
Nonmortgage loans 7.18 5.48 7.45 5.65 6.91 5.66
Direct investment 4.72 1.29 5.06 1.36 5.35 1.37
Junk bonds 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.10
Advances 6.39 3.78 8.33 4.25 10.65 5.34
RAP 1.61 5.26 5.57 4.82 19.41 3.60
GAAP 0.84 4.13 8.10 3.77 22.14 2.65
TAP 2.56 3.30 9.74 2.98 23.55 1.83
Return on assets 0.48 0.04 2.08 0.13 2.84 0.30
Notes: Data are for 205 thrifts resolved in 1988. RAP is regulatory accounting principle capital; GAAP is generally
accepted accounting principle capital; and TAP is tangible accounting principle capital.
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Savings and Loan Regulatory Reports, yearend 1985, 1986, and 1987.
which regulatory accounting practices artificially
inflated capital. The result of these practices was the
delayed closure of insolvent thrifts.14 We examine
this issue further using a regression equation that
relates FHLBank advances to several factors, includ-
ing the impact of regulatory accounting practices on
thrift capital.
Developing a model to explain
FHLBank advances
Our empirical analysis uses a regression model
which relates a thrifts ratio of   FHLBank advances to
total assets to the riskiness of its asset portfolio, book
capital relative to total assets, return on assets, regu-
latory forbearance, and the district in which the thrift
is located. A formal discussion of our regression model
is presented in technical appendix 1.
The riskiness of a thrifts asset portfolio is mea-
sured using the institutions holdings of commercial
real estate, residential mortgage loans, and acquisition
and development loans. Insolvent or high-risk thrifts
tend to hold more commercial real estate loans and
may finance such loans with advances from FHLBanks.
Acquisition and development loans, which are loans
to finance the purchase of land and the improvements
required to convert it to developed building lots, have
been found to add to resolution costs. However, Ben-
ston (1985) finds that changes in a thrifts capital are
positively correlated with changes in acquisition and
development loans. Based on the findings of Barth,
Bartholomew, and Labich (1989) and Brewer and
Mondschean (1994), we predict that such loans would
be positively correlated with advances.
The capital ratio, defined as the ratio of GAAP
net worth to total assets, should be negatively corre-
lated with advances. A decline in capital relative to
total assets increases the cost of alternative sources
of funds, making advances more attractive because
the advance rate does not vary with a thrifts financial
condition. Thus, thrifts with low capital ratios will
tend to borrow more from their FHLBanks than those
with higher capital ratios. Earnings are relevant because
current profitability, defined as the ratio of net income
to total assets, may be a good indicator of a thrifts
future performance. Current profitability also measures
an institutions ability to maintain capital. A decline in
current profitability can be indicative of a relatively
weak financial condition, and is likely to increase the
cost of nondeposit sources of funds.
The extent to which regulators have permitted
cosmetic increases of capital through the use of vari-
ous balance sheet tricks may be correlated with the
ratio of FHLBank advances to total assets. Table 8
provides a list of items thrift regulators included in
capital during the 1980s. To the extent that regulatory
accounting practices delay the closure of troubled
thrifts, we would expect these thrifts to exploit the
advantages of access to flat-rate FHLBank advances.
We measure regulatory forbearance as the difference
between RAP-defined capital and GAAP-defined43 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
TABLE 8
Items used to artificially raise recorded capital
1. Losses from the sale of assets with below market yields can be
deferred (1981). Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
do not permit this type of account to be included in capital.
2. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) allowed qualifying
mutual capital certificates to be used by savings and loans to
increase reported net worth (1980).
3. Income capital certificates are sold (for cash or interest-bearing
notes) to the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation to
increase reported net worth (1981). This item was included in
GAAP net worth in 1984.
4. Net worth certificates are authorized by the Garn-St Germain
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 to increase reported net
worth (October 1982).
5. Contra-asset accounts, including loans in process, unearned
discounts, and deferred fees and credits, are included in net
worth (June 1982).
6. Appraised equity capital (excess over book value of appraised
value of office land, buildings, and improvements, as permitted
by the FHLBB) is included in net worth (1982).
7. Qualifying subordinated debentures having remaining term to
maturity or term to redemption exceeding one year are included
in net worth (1982).
8. Equity can be increased by the amount of goodwill and other
intangible assets resulting from a merger. Goodwill is the
difference between the market value of a firms net worth and
the value based on tangible assets only. Goodwill represents the
value of a franchise, including name recognition, an established
reputation, and loyal customers. For many thrifts, goodwill was
booked as capital when they acquired other enterprises at greater
than tangible asset value.
Source: Barth (1991).
capital.15 We expect forbearance to be positively
correlated with the ratio of FHLBank advances to
total assets.
One of the major distinctions between RAP capital
and GAAP capital is the treatment of gains and losses
on the sale of mortgage loans, mortgage-related securi-
ties, and debt securities. GAAP requires immediate
recognition of gains and losses, while RAP allows a
thrift to defer and amortize such gains and losses.
Brewer (1989) reports that GAAP-insolvent institutions
tend to hold more deferred losses per dollar of assets
than solvent institutions. In the empirical specification,
we examine the relationship between FHLBank advances
and the tendency to defer loan losses.
Another accounting issue is the treatment of
goodwill. Goodwill consists principally of the amount
over book value paid by a thrift to acquire other thrifts.
To encourage healthy thrifts to purchase financially
distressed thrifts, regulators allowed the acquiring
thrift to record the excess of the acquisition price
over the market value of the capital of the troubled
thrift as goodwill and to amortize it as an
expense for up to 40 years.16 This would
inflate the thrifts recorded capital, help-
ing to maintain its aura of safety. To the
extent that thrift regulators used the ad-
vance program to pay acquirers off for
taking over failing thrifts, we would ex-
pect FHLBank advances relative to total
assets to increase with the ratio of good-
will to total assets.
As pointed out by Kane (1989) and
Romer and Weingast (1992), interference
in the regulatory process by members of
Congress on behalf of thrifts in their dis-
tricts delayed closure and, thus, gave
thrifts time to engage in more risk-taking
activities. According to Romer and Wein-
gast (1992), this political interference
was especially pronounced in the Dallas
FHLBank district, as Texas bankers and
real estate developers complained to their
lawmakers that regulators were unfairly
restricting real estate loans and refusing
to allow lenders to restructure bad loans.
This resulted in the well-known meeting
between Edwin Gray, then chairman of the
FHLBB, and Jim Wright, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, to work out
an agreement to give thrifts time to recover
from their financial distress.17 Because
of this political interference, lending by
FHLBanks to thrift institutions is likely
to vary across the 12 FHLBank districts.
To capture differences in lending across districts, we
included in the regression equation an indicator vari-
able for each FHLBank district.18 The indicator vari-
ables absorb the effects of all factors that are common
to thrifts in the same FHLBank district.
Our regression equation also includes several
variables that are a composite of the asset risk variables
and the Dallas FHLBank district indicator variable.
These composite variables capture the impact of vari-
ous political maneuvers in the Dallas FHLBank district
on advances to thrift institutions. This allows us to
determine whether thrifts in the Dallas FHLBank dis-
trict with higher-risk asset portfolios tended to finance
a greater proportion of their assets with FHLBank ad-
vances than those with lower-risk asset portfolios.19
Empirical results
The equation in technical appendix 1 examines
the relationship between FHLBank advances relative
to total assets and a set of correlates. Column 1 in
table 9 represents the basic model, excluding the44 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 9
Relationship between advances and financial characteristics of FSLIC-insured thrifts
(198591)
Composite variables Deferred losses,
Deferred losses (controlling for Dallas goodwill, and
Variable Basic controls and goodwill  FHLBank district) composite variables
Intercept 0.1106 0.0776 0.0789 0.0776
(21.53)*** (20.49)*** (9.49)*** (9.24)***
Boston 0.0150 0.0159 0.0234 0.0202
(4.84)***  (5.12)***  (2.70)***  (2.30)**
New York 0.0272 0.0259 0.0643 0.0608
(11.06)*** (10.50)*** (7.70)*** (7.18)***
Pittsburgh 0.0293 0.0198 0.0586 0.0553
(11.77)*** (7.94)*** (6.95)*** (6.47)***
Atlanta 0.0169 0.0162 0.0563 0.0532
(7.93)*** 7.54)*** (6.72)*** (6.26)***
Cincinnati 0.0278 0.0270 0.0659 0.0627
(7.90)*** (12.88)*** (12.42)*** (7.43)***
Indianapolis 0.0199 0.0188 0.0575 0.0541
(8.23)*** (7.76)*** (6.26)*** (6.38)***
Chicago 0.0290 0.0280 0.0659 0.0627
(13.50)*** (13.03)*** (8.05)*** (7.56)***
Des Moines 0.0116 0.0104 0.0490 0.0456
(4.56)*** (4.11)*** (5.89)*** (5.42)***
Topeka 0.0180 0.0192 0.0208 0.0173
(6.04)*** (6.45)*** (2.46)** (2.03)**
San Francisco 0.0284 0.0277 0.0678 0.0648
(10.95)*** (10.60)*** (7.98)*** (7.52)***
Seattle 0.0259 0.0268 0.0127 0.0095
(6.78)*** (7.05)*** (1.42) (1.06)
Time-1990 0.0133 0.0123 0.0129 0.01129
(7.76)*** (7.12)*** (7.61)*** (7.00)***
Commercial real estate 0.0926 0.0945 0.1113 0.1120
(loans/total assets) (11.56)*** (11.81)*** (13.61)*** (13.72)***
Commercial real estate   0.1141 0.1090
 ´ Dallas (4.06)*** (1.22)***
Residential mortgage 0.0002 0.0025 0.0088 0.0103
(loans/total assets) (0.06) (0.82) (3.15)*** (3.69)***
Residential mortgage   0.0568 0.0524
 ´ Dallas (4.54)*** (4.15)***
Acquisition and development 0.0193 0.0177 0.0841 0.0837
(loans/total assets) (1.14) (1.04) (4.50)*** (4.50)***
Acquisition and development   0.1241 0.1242
´ Dallas (3.84)*** (3.83)***
Return on assets 0.1467 0.1355 0.1486 0.1381
(1.53) (1.41) (1.57) (1.45)
Size  0.0143 0.0137 0.0143 0.0137
(37.89)*** (34.89)*** (37.51)*** (35.37)***
Capital ratio  0.0382 0.0392 0.0405 0.0414
(1.78)* (1.81)* (2.04)** (2.05)**
Forbearance  0.2430 0.4189 0.2334 0.4048
(4.50)*** (3.52)*** (4.50)*** (3.50)***
Deferred loan loss  0.2559  0.2500
to total assets (2.03)** (2.03)**
Goodwill to total assets  0.1776  0.1686
(6.09)*** (5.46)***
Number of observations 20,373 20,373 20,373 20,373
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23
F-statistic 244.38 231.02 223.22 212.30
* Indicates significance at the 10% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Notes: This table provides the regression results of the relationship between the ratio of FHLBank advances to total assets and selected financial characteristics of
FSLIC-insured thrifts. The basic controls are FHLBank indicator variables, commercial, residential, and acquisition and development loan ratios, return on assets,
size of a thrift, the capital ratio, and the forbearance variable. The city variables are indicator variables for FHLBank districts. The indicator variable takes on a value of
1 if the thrift is located in that FHLBank district and 0 otherwise. The omitted indicator variable is the Dallas FHLBank district. Thus, the coefficients on the FHLBank
district indicator variables are all relative to the Dallas FHLBank district. The mortgage loan variables are multiplied by the Dallas FHLBank district indicator variable
(Dallas) to create some composite variables to be used in several of the empirical specifications. Dallas is equal to 1 if a thrift is located in the Dallas FHLBank district,
zero otherwise. Time-1990 is equal to 1 if year is greater than or equal to 1990, zero otherwise. ROA is net income divided by total assets; size is the natural logarithm
of total assets; capital ratio is generally accepted accounting principle capital divided by total assets; and forbearance is the difference between regulatory accounting
principle capital and generally accepted accounting principle capital divided by total assets. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are
t-statistics.
Source: Authors calculations.45 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
separate effects on advances of deferred loan losses,
goodwill, and the composite variables. Column 2 adds
the separate effects of deferred loan losses and good-
will to the basic regression equation in column 1. Col-
umn 3 expands the basic equation to include the com-
posite variables that interact the FHLBank of Dallas
indicator variable with the asset risk measures. Column
4 adds the separate measures of regulatory forbearance
(deferred loan losses and goodwill) to the empirical
specification in column 3.
The results in table 9 column 1 indicate that the
capital ratio and the forbearance variable are both
correlated with thrift advances. Advances decline as
capital increases, supporting the hypothesis that ad-
vances were particularly attractive to poorly capital-
ized institutions. The coefficient on the capital ratio,
0.0382, means that a 1 percentage point decrease in
the capital ratio was associated with an approximately
0.4 percentage point increase in the ratio of FHLBank
advances to total assets. Thrifts that relied heavily
on regulatory accounting tricks to inflate their capital
tended to borrow more from FHLBanks than other
institutions. The coefficient suggests that a 1 percent-
age point increase in the difference between RAP
capital and GAAP capital resulted in a 2.43 percent-
age point increase in the ratio of FHLBank advances
to total assets. This is statistically significant at con-
ventional levels.
The positive coefficients on commercial real estate
loans and acquisition and development loans indicate
that as the fraction of assets in these categories in-
creased, institutions borrowed more. The results in
table 9 also suggest that more profitable and smaller
institutions tended to borrow less. The size effect is
statistically significant at conventional levels, while
the profitability effect is not. Finally, thrifts in the
Dallas district tended to borrow more than thrifts
in other FHLBank districts, except for thrifts in the
FHLBank districts of Boston, Topeka, and Seattle.
For example, thrifts in the Chicago district had, on
average, an FHLBank advances-to-total-assets ratio
that was 2.90 percentage points lower than that of
thrifts in the Dallas district.
Table 9, column 2 includes measures of regulatory
accounting tricks used to inflate recorded capital at
thrifts. Holding everything else constant, thrifts that
relied more heavily on deferred loan losses to inflate
capital tended to borrow less, while those with relatively
more goodwill tended to borrow more. The coefficient
on the deferred loan loss variable suggests that a
1 percentage point increase in this variable was asso-
ciated with a 2.56 percentage point decrease in the
FHLBank advances-to-total-assets ratio. Thus, a thrift
with a lower ratio of deferred loan losses to total assets
than another thrift borrowed less from FHLBanks,
even if the two institutions had the same gap between
RAP capital and GAAP capital. Although the sale of
assets with below market yields generates losses for
a thrift, it is an alternative to FHLBank borrowing.
The results in table 9 also imply that a 1 percentage
point increase in the goodwill ratio was associated
with a 1.78 percentage point increase in the FHLBank
advances-to-total-assets ratio.
Column 3 of table 9 reports the results of including
the composite variables (that is, the product of the
Dallas FHLBank indicator variable and the risk vari-
ables) in the basic regression equation. The total
impact on the advances ratio of thrifts in the Dallas
district of, say, changes in residential mortgage loans
is the sum of the coefficients on the residential mort-
gage loan ratio, 0.0088, and the residential mortgage
loan ratio composite term, 0.0568. Similar calculations
are performed to determine the impact on the advances
ratio of thrifts in the Dallas district of changes in the
other mortgage loan categories. For thrifts outside
the Dallas district, the coefficients on the mortgage
loan ratios capture the impact on those thrifts ad-
vances ratio.
When the composite terms are added to the basic
specification, the coefficient estimates on the capital,
forbearance, earnings, and size variables are qualita-
tively similar to those reported in column 1 of table 9.
For example, the capital ratio continues to be nega-
tively correlated with the advances ratio, though the
coefficient estimate is 0.0405 in this empirical speci-
fication compared with 0.0382 in the basic model in
column 1. The results in column 3 suggest that thrifts
in the Dallas FHLBank district with relatively higher
assets devoted to, for example, residential mortgage
loans tended to borrow less than other institutions
(0.0088  0.0568 = 0.048). This implies that a 1 percent-
age point increase in the residential mortgage loan
ratio was associated with a 0.05 percentage point
decrease in the advances ratio. This result is incon-
sistent with the stated purpose of FHLBank advances
to support the residential real estate market. Table 9,
column 4 combines additional measures of regulatory
capital forbearance with the specification used in col-
umn 3. The results are similar to those reported in col-
umn 3. Overall, low capital institutions borrowed more,
and thrifts engaging in regulatory accounting practices
made heavy use of the FHLBank lending facility.
The effects of FHLBank advances on
common stock returns
Next, we examine whether changes in FHLBank
advances were correlated with common stock returns
and, if so, whether the correlation was positive for46 Economic Perspectives
TABLE 10
Thrift stock returns and changes in FHLBank
advances by failure category
(Q1 1985 through Q4 1992)
Variable Coefficient estimates
Intercept   4.2627
(5.2919)***
1/previous period market




Average thrift  1.9579
(2.5135)***
Marginal effect of failing thrift    2.3473
(2.786)***





Number of observations 2,372
*** Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Notes: This table provides the results of a pooled cross
series regression relating thrift common stock returns to
changes in FHLBank advances, using a two-factor market
model. Individual thrift stock market and interest rate variables
are omitted. Failed is equal to 1 if a thrift is seized by thrift
regulators during the sample period; average thrift is the
change in FHLBank advances divided by previous period
market value of equity; marginal effect of failing thrift is the
change in FHLBank advances divided by previous period
market value of equity times the failed indicator variable. The
market value of equity is calculated by multiplying the number
of shares outstanding at the end of each quarter by the price
of the thrifts common stock at the end of the quarter. The
numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are
t-statistics and have been computed using a procedure
suggested by White (1990).
Source: Authors calculations.
thrifts that were expected to benefit from borrowing
at subsidized rates from FHLBanks. We know that
during the thrift crisis, the FSLIC assisted insolvent
thrifts by using regulatory accounting practices or
granting a temporary reprieve from closure. These
policies raised the amount by which assets had to fall
before regulators would resolve a thrift, increasing
access to federal deposit insurance. FHLBank advances
were instrumental in allowing financially distressed
thrifts to continue to operate. Furthermore, because
the FHLBanks claim to thrift assets was senior to
that of the FSLIC, increases in advances increased
the FSLICs risk of loss, raising the value of access
to federal deposit insurance (see Brickley and James,
1986). As a result, we would expect an increase in
advances to lead to a one-time positive return to
shareholders. This effect should be most important
for institutions with a relatively high proportion
of  FHLBank advances on their balance sheets. To
investigate this hypothesis, we examined whether the
impact of changes in FHLBank advances on thrifts
common stock returns varied across failure groups.
A formal discussion of our approach is presented in
technical appendix 2.
The results of estimating equation 4 in technical
appendix 2 are reported in table 10. The coefficient
for failing thrifts measuring the change in FHLBank
advances relative to previous quarter market value
of equity is the sum of the average thrift coefficient
and the marginal effect of failing thrift coefficient and
is 0.3905. This coefficient implies that failing thrifts
experienced one-time common stock return
increases, following an increase in advances from
FHLBanks. Are the implied differences in common
stock returns large? To answer this question, we need
to know what changes in the variable are plausible.
One way to establish this is by looking at the impact
of a one standard deviation change in a variable. For
a normally distributed variable, there is a 68 percent
chance that the variable will be within one standard
deviation of its mean. A one standard deviation in-
crease in the change in FHLBank advances relative
to previous quarter market value of equity was asso-
ciated with a 253 basis point common stock return
increase for failing thrifts. In contrast, the coefficient
of 1.9579 suggests that non-failing thrifts experi-
enced a decrease in common stock returns. In other
words, the stock market responded positively to in-
creases in advances from FHLBanks only for failing
thrifts. This supports the view that such advances
provided financially distressed institutions with a
subsidy and that value-maximizing troubled thrifts
had an incentive to take advantage of this subsidy.
Conclusion
This article examines the FHLBank System and
its role in the thrift debacle of the 1980s. The FHLBank
System was established to extend funds to thrifts in
support of their mortgage lending activity. The percep-
tion that thrifts needed a specialized lending institution
was based on their unique liquidity problems. While
FHLBanks provide thrifts with access to nondeposit
sources of funds, they can provide an opportunity
for financially distressed institutions to borrow at rel-
atively attractive interest rates. FHLBanks can raise
funds at lower cost than non-government entities
because of their perceived well-capitalized position,
the tax-exempt status of their debt obligations at the
state and local levels, and their implicit government
guarantee. We have found that during the 1985 to 1991
period, financially distressed thrifts tended to borrow
more from FHLBanks than other institutions. In addition,47 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
the regulatory practice of allowing troubled thrifts to
artificially inflate their recorded capital tended to be asso-
ciated with higher levels of borrowing from FHLBanks.
Our results suggest that FHLBank advances were
used more by financially distressed thrift institutions
than by other firms. Thus, the provision of aid to these
institutions may have added to the cost of resolving
failed thrifts during the 1980s and early 1990s, con-
tributing to one of the most expensive bailouts in U.S.
history. This implies that the FHLBank System advance
program can have unintended consequences. The
system was created to provide long-term liquidity to
lending institutions specializing in residential real
estate, so as to improve the flow of mortgage credit.
While this concept made sense after the Great Depres-
sion, it may not in todays financial market. In the more
than 60 years since the FHLBank System was created,
the financial markets have become more efficient
with the introduction of a secondary market for mort-
gages and widespread use of mortgage securitization
programs. These developments raise the question
whether there is a need for a government-sponsored
liquidity facility for real-estate-specialized lenders.
The question takes on added importance in view of
our finding that the smallest thrifts tended to make
less use of FHLBank advances than other thrifts. Fur-
thermore, FHLBank advances do not subject borrow-
ing thrifts to the discipline that would be imposed by
other creditors and market analysts. By insulating
them from market discipline, FHLBank advance pro-
grams provide incentives for thrifts to take more risk.
Finally, our results provide empirical evidence
that when the advance rate is flat and at the level that
a large, well-capitalized institution can obtain in the
financial markets, value-maximizing troubled thrifts
will tend to borrow more, leading to one-time common
stock return increases. Thus, access to FHLBank
advances provides benefits to financially distressed
institutions and these benefits tend to be reflected in
the common stock returns of publicly traded thrifts.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 1
FHLBank advances and thrift
financial characteristics
Following Mays and DeMarco (1989), we relate the
ratio of FHLBank advances to total assets to a set of
variables representing a thrifts financial characteris-
tics and economic environment. To allow for the role
of capital forbearance on a thrifts use of FHLBank
advances, we include a variable measuring the extent
to which a thrift has been allowed to invent assets
to artificially inflate its capital. An empirical specifica-
tion relating the ratio of FHLBank advances to total
assets (Aj,t
k) of thrift j in period t and FHLBank district k



























where RISKj,t is a vector that contains the various
measures of risk of the asset portfolio of thrift j in
period t; BVAj,t is the ratio of book value of capital to
total assets; ROAj,t is the return on assets; FBj,t is a
variable that captures regulatory forbearance; FREGk
(k = 2, ..., 12) is an indicator that equals one if the
thrift is located in the kth FHLBank district and zero
otherwise; and Îj,t is an error term.
The risk index of a thrifts asset portfolio, RISKj,t,
is captured by a thrifts holdings of commercial real
estate loans, residential mortgage loans, and acquisi-
tion and development loans. All mortgage variables
are divided by total assets. Barth and Bradley (1989)
find that, within the mortgage category, insolvent
institutions rapidly increased their commercial real
estate lending during the 1980s. Barth, Bartholomew,
and Labich (1989) indicate that acquisition and devel-
opment loans, which are loans to finance the purchase
of land and the improvements required to convert it
to developed building lots, have a positive and sta-
tistically significant effect on resolution costs. Table
9 reports the results of our pooled cross-section
time-series regressions using yearend data for all
FSLIC-insured institutions from 1985 to 1991. The
dependent variable is yearend advances to total
assets for each institution. The t-statistics reported
in table 9 have been computed using a procedure
suggested by White (1980).48 Economic Perspectives
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 2
Thrift stock returns and FHLBank advances
To determine the effect of FHLBank advances on
common stock returns, we need to quantify the bene-
fits of access to an FHLBank lending facility. We would
expect these benefits to be reflected in the common
stock returns of publicly traded thrifts. The behavior
of stock returns provides reasonable and readily avail-
able information because there is a direct relationship
between stock returns and the value of the underlying
assets and the value of various types of subsidies. The
first step in the development of the empirical model,
following Stone (1974), is to relate the common stock
return of thrift j in period t, RETj,t, to the rate of return
on a stock market index in period t, RMKTt, and an
interest rate factor in period t, RTBONDt:
2 01 2 ), ,, RET RMKT RTBOND jt t t jt =+ + + Î bb b
where Îj,t is a stochastic error term. The asset pricing
model in equation 2 has been used by Lloyd and Shick
(1977), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Chance and Lane
(1980), Flannery and James (1984), Kane and Unal
(1988), and Kwan (1991) to investigate the interest rate
sensitivity of bank and thrift stock returns.
The asset pricing model argues that returns on
individual stocks are related, in part, to the return on
a market portfolio, a perfectly diversified portfolio of
all assets. The variability of the individual stock returns
that is related to changes in the return on the market
portfolio is market risk. This market risk is character-
ized by the stocks beta value. An average stock
whose return fluctuates one-for-one with the market
return has a beta equal to one. Stocks with greater
than average market-related risk have betas higher
than one, while low market-risk stocks have betas
less than one.
Thrift stock returns are also sensitive to move-
ments in interest rates, because thrifts typically fail
to match the interest rate sensitivity of their assets
and liabilities. As a result, movements in interest rates
affect the market value of each side of the thrifts bal-
ance sheet differently and, consequently, both its net
worth and stock value.
In addition, stock returns of thrifts might be affected
by the extent to which the thrifts make use of loans
from FHLBanks. Because the rate charged for advances
does not vary according to the financial condition of
the borrowing institution, it is possible that some thrifts
are paying too high a price and some too low a price
to borrow funds. Garcia and Plautz (1988) indicate that
advances may not be priced below the rate that a large,
well-capitalized thrift could obtain on its own in the
deposit market. However, since this is a flat rate, it
would seem most likely that the rate charged finan-
cially distressed thrifts is below the level the market
would charge given the associations financial condi-
tion and collateral. Thus, flat-rate FHLBank advances
provide a financially distressed thrift with a subsidy.
The common stock returns of such thrifts should reflect
this subsidy. Equation 2 can be expanded to account
for this subsidy. The expanded model, which is based
on a version of the model in Brewer (1995), can be
written as:

























where DFHLBj,t is the change in jth thrift FHLBank
advances at time t; and MVj, t1 is the market value of
equity of the jth thrift in period t1.
With flat-rate FHLBank advances, value-maximizing
thrifts have an incentive to borrow from their FHLBank
to take advantage of the subsidy. How stock returns
change with variations in FHLBank advances depends
on whether the thrift is in financially distress. As noted
earlier, financially distressed institutions are most
likely to receive FHLBank advances at rates below
those they could obtain in the deposit market. There-
fore, we would expect the change in FHLBank advances
to have a positive impact on the stock returns of finan-
cially distressed thrifts. To investigate this further,
we created two groups. The first group includes all
thrifts that failed at some point during the sample period.
The second group includes only the surviving thrifts.
This separation allows us to examine whether changes
in FHLBank advances have a different impact on
common stock returns of thrifts, depending on their
financial condition.
Since thrifts invest primarily in mortgages, we
assume that the primary factor affecting the markets
valuation of a thrifts assets is changes in the market
value of mortgages. The holding period returns associ-
ated with long-term U.S. government bonds (RTBOND),
obtained from Ibbotson Associates (1996) bond index ,
are used to measure changes in the market value of
mortgages. The interest rate factor is based on the
returns on U.S. government bonds to ensure that the
estimated relationship between thrift stock returns and
changes in interest rates is free from contamination
resulting from changes in default premia. The long-term49 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
returns index is used because the bulk of thrift assets
are long term. The return on a stock market index,
RMKT, is included in the equation to assess a thrifts
systematic market sensitivity.
The other important factors affecting common
stock returns are associated with changes in the
FHLBank advances relative to market value of equity
in the previous period, (DFHLBj,t/MVj,t1), and return
on assets in period t, ROAt. We include return on assets
to capture the impact of other firm-specific factors on
thrift stock returns.






























































where b1,j is the stock market beta coefficient of the
jth thrift (j = 1, ..., N); b2,j measures the effect of inter-
est rates on the stock returns of the jth thrift given its
relation to the market index; Wj is a cross-sectional
dummy variable that equals one for the jth thrift and
zero otherwise; FAILED is a binary variable that equals
one for a failed thrift and zero otherwise; and  wj,t is
a stochastic error term. Both the stock market and the
interest rate coefficients are held fixed over time, but
allowed to vary across thrifts. Estimation of equation
4 allows us to investigate the equity market response
to changes in FHLBank advances. The variable FAILED
serves as a proxy for financially distressed firms. The
coefficient on (DFHLBj,t/MVj,t1) ´ FAILED, b4,1, measures
how much more the common stock returns of failing
thrifts change relative to those of non-failing thrifts as
a result of a change in advances from FHLBanks. The
sum of b4 and b4,1 measures how much more the com-
mon stock returns of failing thrifts change with changes
in advances from FHLBanks. If access to FHLBank
advances is a valuable option for failing thrifts, then
an increase in FHLBank advances should lead to an
increase in their common stock returns (that is, the
sum of b4 and b4,1 should be positive).
Notes: The data used in the estimation of equation 4 are for
99 thrift organizations whose stocks were traded on the New
York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or over
the counter and which filed FHLBB Report of Condition data
for each quarter from January 1985 to December 1992. A
few of the 99 thrifts were resolved by thrift regulators prior
to the end of the sample period. These institutions are in-
cluded in the sample period for the quarters before resolution
and excluded for the period after resolution. Stock market data
are from Interactive Data Services, Inc. For multiple thrift
holding companies, the assets of individual thrift subsidiaries
were summed in constructing the balance-sheet variables used
in the regression equations. At the end of 1987, the 99 thrifts
had $456 billion in total assets, representing about 47 percent
of the industrys total assets. Twenty-five had total assets of
more than $5 billion; 48 had total assets of $1 billion to $5
billion; and the 26 remaining thrifts had total assets of less
than $1 billion.
    Common stock returns over a quarter are calculated by
compounding daily common stock returns within a quarter.
The market value of common stock is calculated by multi-
plying the number of shares outstanding at the end of each
quarter by the price of the thrifts common stock at the end
of the quarter. The holding period return on a long-term U.S.
government bond portfolio (from the monthly index by
Ibbotson Associates, 1996) is used to measure changes in the
market value of mortgages. Monthly returns are compounded
to produce quarterly returns. The stock market portfolio is
the value-weighted portfolio (NYSE and AMEX) from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
NOTES
1See Garcia and Plautz (1988) for an excellent discussion
of the collateralization requirements of the FHLBank Sys-
tem and how troubled S&Ls were able to get around these
requirements.
2The FSLICs policies and procedures for guaranteed advances
specify that guarantees will be provided for advances only if
the insured S&L is a supervisory case that 1) is book-value
insolvent, 2) is cash insolvent, 3) is losing money so that it
will soon become book-value insolvent, 4) has insufficient
collateral to obtain an advance without a guarantee, and 5)
has agreed to be merged when the FSLIC can find a suitable
merger partner. See Garcia and Plautz (1988) for an excel-
lent discussion of this program.
3In October 1984, the FHLBB placed a sunset provision on
the use of deferred losses on the sale of mortgages with below-
market interest rates.  After October 24,  1984, thrifts were
prohibited from amortizing losses on sales of new mortgages.
However, they were still allowed to defer losses on loans
made prior to October 24, 1984. See Hill and Ingram
(1989) for a discussion.
4Hunter, Verbrugge, and Whidbee (1996) found significant evi-
dence of forbearance in the regulation of de novo thrifts in
the 1980s.50 Economic Perspectives
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